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Abstract: Functionalism is widely regarded as the central doctrine in the philosophy 
of cognitive science, and is invoked by philosophers of cognitive science to settle 
disputes over methodology and other puzzles. I describe a recent dispute over 
extended cognition in which many commentators appeal to functionalism. I then 
raise an objection to functionalism as it figures in this dispute, targeting the 
assumption that generality and abstraction are tightly correlated. Finally, I argue that 
the new mechanist framework offers more realistic resources for understanding 
cognitive science, and hence is a better source of appeal for resolving disagreement 
in philosophy of science. 
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1 Introduction. Functionalism is the doctrine that mental or cognitive states are functional states, 
whose identity conditions are articulable in terms of their characteristic inputs, outputs, and relations 
to other intermediate states. Functionalism was established as a central doctrine in the philosophy of 
cognitive science in the 1960s (Putnam 1967a, b, Fodor 1968), and though it has become less central 
to much contemporary discussion (Chemero & Silberstein 2008) it retains the notoriety of an 
orthodoxy in philosophy of mind (Buechner 2011) and in contemporary philosophy of cognitive 
science (Eliasmith 2002, Clark 2008, Sprevak 2009, Chalmers 2011). This remains true even though 
functionalism has been an embattled doctrine for decades (Block & Fodor 1972, Block 1980, Shagrir 
2005, Godfrey-Smith 2008), has proliferated versions and variations (Levin 2013, Maley & Piccinini 
MS), and even though the canonical argument for functionalism—the argument from multiple 
realizability—has been subjected to a variety of criticisms (Batitsky 1998, Bechtel & Mundale 1999). 
This is all, importantly, to say nothing of other views that happen, unhappily, to be called 
“functionalism” in biology or in pre-behaviorist psychology (Cummins 1975, Sober 1985, Chemero 
2009) but which have different intellectual lineages. My discussion concerns only Putnam’s machine 
functionalism and derivative views. The persistence of functionalism is hardly a special case. It is the 
fate of many “received views,” such as the belief-desire model of intentional action or the deductive-
nomological model of explanation, to remain central to a literature despite decades of convincing 
criticism so long as there is no sufficiently dominant successor. The new mechanist view of 
explanation (Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000, Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, Craver 2007) has 
  
recently achieved this status in the philosophies of the biological sciences, supplanting the deductive-
nomological model and other law-subsumption models as a received view of explanation in those 
sciences. This is not to say that new mechanism is correct or uncontroversial, only that it has 
replaced other models of explanation as the primary target of interpretation and criticism. 
Bearing in mind the tenacity of received views, my aim in this paper is not to simply poke 
more holes in the sinking ship of functionalism. Rather, I aim to promote an alternative vessel for 
philosophers of mind and cognitive science to pilot through choppy waters. To this end I will raise a 
“grain” objection to functionalism, based on the relationship between generalization and “fineness-
of-grain.” This objection is not a knock-down argument against all varieties or uses of functionalism. 
However, it needn’t be, since functionalism is a sinking ship, and since my objection does apply to 
versions of functionalism that figure in notorious, recent disputes in the philosophy of cognitive 
science. I shall take as my example the controversy over extended cognition, especially its recent 
high-profile epicycle concerning the relation between extended cognition and functionalism (Rupert 
2004, Clark 2008, Sprevak 2009). In the last section I will argue that new mechanism provides better 
resources for understanding variation between models in cognitive science, and for understanding 
the practice of generalization. In particular, mechanism is not vulnerable to the grain objection. I do 
not claim, of course, that mechanism is free from criticism or worries or that I have made clear what 
was once obscure. My aim, rather, is to motivate a change of focus in discussions of cognitive 
science from functionalism to mechanism. 
 
2 Functionalism and Extended Cognition. Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) notoriously 
claim that cognition (like meaning) ain’t all in the head. They argue that in certain cases the use of 
external props in some activities—a computer processor while playing some video games, one’s 
notebook in carrying out one’s plans for the day, perhaps one’s partner in remembering past 
events—is such that those props should be considered parts of one’s own cognitive economy, 
similarly to parts of one’s brain. This claim has become known as the hypothesis of extended 
cognition (HEC). The most famous example concerns Otto, an older gentleman with a bad memory 
who uses a notebook to help him remember facts and plans.1 In their argument, Clark and Chalmers 
appeal to what has become known as the “parity principle,” which states that 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it 
done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of a cognitive 
process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. 
(Clark & Chalmers 1998, 8) 
                                                     
1 The Otto example is originally an illustration not of extended cognition but of the extended mind, which is a distinct 
claim. Although this distinction is essential for charitably evaluating Clark and Chalmers’ arguments, it is almost always 
ignored in the critical literature (even by Clark). Since I am not evaluating HEC here, I will ignore the distinction for ease 
of exposition. 
  
One way to interpret this principle is as a corollary of functionalism: cognitive states are individuated 
by their functional relations (to inputs, outputs, and each other), and it is immaterial whether their 
realizers are located inside the brain or outside the body.2 Thus, activities should count as cognitive 
processes if those body-external processes exhibit the same functional relationships (to inputs, 
outputs, and cognitive states) as other processes that we already happily consider cognitive 
processes. Of course, understood this way the parity principle only justifies a commitment to 
extended cognition if the functional relations are specified so that body-external activities and props 
do satisfy those specifications, and many cognitive and psychological processes can be specified in a 
variety of ways. Robert Rupert argues that Otto’s notebook in the famous example cannot serve as a 
memory in part because it fails to satisfy the most fruitful functional description of human memory. 
Cognitive psychologists have documented many features of human memory—for example 
susceptibility to interference effects, generation effects, and conformity to the Rescorla-Wagner law 
(see Rupert 2004, 413–419). Since Otto’s external “memory” does not exhibit these effects the parity 
principle does not license the attribution to Otto of extended cognitive processes (Rupert 2004). 
Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa (2001) argue for the same conclusion because Otto’s use of his 
notebook must be described via inter alia relations to perceptual and motor intermediaries (he flips 
through the notebook, reads it, &c.), whereas canonical examples of internal memory are not related 
to perceptual and motor activities in the same way. 
Mark Sprevak calls these objections the RAA (for Rupert, Adams, and Aizawa) objections. 
Sprevak suggests that “All varieties of functionalism contain a parameter that controls how finely or 
coarsely functional roles should be specified (how much should be abstracted and ignored)” 
(Sprevak 2009, 510). He observes that RAA trade on fine-grained differences between Otto’s use of 
his notebook and canonical examples of memory. A coarse-grained functional description of 
memory might simply describe the relations between past perceptions and actions and future 
behaviour, but not describe memory as e.g. exhibiting interference or generation effects, or as 
obeying the Rescorla-Wagner law. Fine-grained functional descriptions may specify these relations, 
but are objectionable because they conflict with the common intuition that there could be Martians 
who have cognitive processes but whose cognitive architecture is distinctly different from ours. Such 
Martians, unlike us, may not exhibit interference or generation effects, and may even store 
information by manipulating ink-marks on paper inside of their brains, and retrieve it by reading the 
marks back with photosensitive organs. The “Martian intuition” is that while this is an alien form of 
memory, it is memory nonetheless. Since such Martians have memory, and their memory may have 
the same fine-grained functional description as Otto’s use of his notebook, the parity principle 
demands that we consider Otto’s a case of extended cognition. Thus Sprevak argues that 
functionalism implies HEC. 
Unfortunately for the defenders of HEC, however, Sprevak argues that coarse-grained 
functional descriptions are no more acceptable, for the parity principle is less restrictive than Clark 
and Chalmers anticipate. Since we can imagine far-fetched Martian minds, the parity principle 
                                                     
2 This is accepted by most of Clark and Chalmers’ critics (Adams & Aizawa 2001, Rupert 2004, Sprevak 2009), and is 
almost certainly not the best interpretation of the parity principle. 
  
licenses a radical form of HEC. For example, we might imagine Martian minds that are embedded 
with factual information that must be retrieved with effort, so that this process has functional parity 
with the activity of looking up information in a library. Such possibilities seem to license radical 
cases of extended cognition: that contents of volumes in a library are beliefs of any person in the 
library, or that being in possession of a graphing calculator gives one a knowledge of integral 
calculus (517–518). These consequences, Sprevak argues, are absurd, and justify a reductio of radical 
HEC and, since it entails radical HEC, of functionalism. 
 
3 Going against the Grain. The dispute over HEC is not seen by its partisans as an idle 
philosophical discussion, but as a battle for the soul of cognitive science. If HEC is true, it is 
claimed, it has dramatic consequences for the way cognitive scientists conduct their research. Hence, 
both defenses and criticisms of HEC draw on empirical results and claims about theory-choice in 
science (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998, Rupert 2004, Adams & Aizawa 2008, Clark 2008, Rowlands 
2010). The fact that so many of the arguments concerning HEC trade on interpretations of 
functionalism reveals the belief of many that functionalism provides a suitable framework for 
understanding cognitive scientific models. Disagreements about HEC force a discussion of what 
precisely the laws of cognitive science are—both what their proprieties are with respect to 
generalization, and what phenomena should be investigated and accommodated in order to 
construct those laws. In Putnam-style functionalism, functional descriptions (i.e. via Ramsey 
sentences, cf. Lewis 1972) operate as laws characterizing mental states. Putnam’s proposal aspires 
explicitly to generalization over diverse kinds of system—e.g. about pain in primates and also in 
cephalopods. The arguments that arise in connection with the RAA objections to HEC concern 
whether descriptions of e.g. memory generalize over head-internal vehicles and extended vehicles 
(like Otto’s notebook-use). 
Like Clark and Sprevak, Hilary Putnam is wary of psychological chauvinism (human-
specificity). A type-physicalist account of pain (Place 1956, Smart 1959), like the simplistic 
conjecture that pain is the activation of C-fibers, denies without motivation that animals that lack C-
fibers have pain-states. In Putnam’s canonical argument for functionalism, functionalism achieves 
generality by proposing abstracted descriptions that omit physiological and other details. Sprevak’s grain 
parameter makes this maneuver more explicit by proposing a continuum of descriptions that are 
increasingly abstract, in the sense of omitting detail, and therefore increasingly general. (Some may 
object to the use of the word “abstract” as the complement of “detailed,” rather than of “concrete.” 
However, Sprevak uses the word this way and there is ample precedent for his doing so (Levy & 
Bechtel 2013).) Consider a toy functional description of pain: pain is caused by tissue damage, and 
causes stress, increased metabolic activity, and evasion of the damaging stimulus. This description 
denotes processes in a variety of complex organisms, including cephalopods (which lack C-fibers). 
Elements can be added to this description to make it more fine-grained, and to denote processes in 
progressively more restricted classes of organisms. For example, if pain also tends to cause excited 
  
vocalization, then creatures like cephalopods which do not vocalize will not satisfy this more fine-
grained description of pain. 
However, Sprevak’s grain parameter is not an effective way of capturing variation between 
cognitive models. In the space of models that cognitive scientists actually produce, generality-
specificity and abstraction-detail are independent dimensions of variation. By way of example, I shall 
mention two cognitive models in which generality and abstraction are dissociated. The first, the 
motor theory of speech perception (Liberman et al. 1967, Liberman & Mattingly 1985), is quite 
abstract but highly specific to humans. The motor theory claims that “perceiving speech is 
perceiving gestures,” and more specifically that the recognition of phonemes and words in natural 
language is mediated by processing in the motor system, namely motor processing that also governs 
the articulation of speech in the vocal tract. There are animals other than humans that can identify 
phonemes and words—dogs commonly learn to recognize some words, and chinchillas have been 
trained to distinguish natural language phonemes (Kuhl & Miller 1978)—but since they do not have 
the relevant vocal capacities they most likely exhibit this capacity exclusively by recognizing auditory 
patterns, whereas humans do not. Nevertheless, the motor theory is quite abstract—it specifies that 
speech perception depends on structures that govern vocalization. While there are more detailed 
claims about how this dependency manifests in humans (e.g. McGurk & MacDonald 1976), all of 
them are consistent with the motor theory.  
On the other hand, feature-detector models of vision (e.g. Barlow 1953, Hubel & Wiesel 
1962) are detailed, but general. Even normalization-based models of feature-detection in particular 
(Heeger 1992, Carandini & Heeger 1994), which are described by Mazviita Chirimuuta (2014), are 
quite general. These models describe sensitivity to contrasts, edges, &c. in early stages of visual 
processing, and unify evidence about the receptive fields of individual neurons as well as 
computational models of their response dynamics. On Heeger’s normalization model, neurons in 
visual cortex respond linearly to excitatory input from the lateral geniculate nucleus, but inhibit each 
other “laterally” according to an equation. The terms of the equation stand for properties and 
activities of individual neurons and populations of neurons. This model can be integrated into 
conjectures about the gross architecture of visual cognition (Marr 1982), and features in the 
“standard model” of primary visual cortex (Rust & Movshon 2005). However, even without 
supplementation with other models of visual processing the normalization model makes quantitative 
predictions about neuronal activity and has a well-specified physiological interpretation. 
Nevertheless, despite the level of detail in contemporary feature-detector models, they do not apply 
only to humans. Early evidence for normalization was gathered largely from cats and frogs, and the 
models may generalize to all vertebrate vision. 
I am sympathetic to Sprevak’s conclusion that functionalism is false, however functionalism 
is in worse shape than he acknowledges. His argument presupposes that we can manipulate 
abstraction from detail like the mesh of a sieve to sift the chauvinistic cognitive models from the 
liberal models. However, the motor theory of speech perception and feature-detector models of 
visual processing illustrate the double dissociation between abstraction from detail and generality 
  
over diverse kinds of cognitive systems. If the grain parameter is supposed to track degrees of 
abstraction from detail, then it fails to simultaneously track generalizability in cognitive models. If it 
is meant to track both, it fails to accurately capture the variation in cognitive models. Either way it 
incorporates false presuppositions about the character of the variety in cognitive models. 
 
4 Generality without Laws. The problems with functionalism that are made explicit in the “grain” 
objection are inherited from the covering-law view of explanation and generalization that was 
popular throughout the twentieth century. On that conception, generalization is achieved by 
subsuming many phenomena under a common description (expressing a “covering law”). However, 
the covering-law view has in recent years been supplanted by the new mechanist view of 
explanation, at least in the biological sciences. The mechanists hold that many scientific 
explanations, including a preponderance of explanations in the biological sciences, are achieved by 
specifying models of mechanisms. The extension of the mechanist view to cognitive science requires 
the suppression of certain controversial assumptions developed for biological contexts (especially 
certain assumptions of Craver 2007, see Weiskopf 2011, Chirimuuta 2014), but not all mechanists 
make these assumptions (cf. Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000, Bechtel 2008). 
Let us suppose that the primary explananda of cognitive science are intelligent behaviors or 
cognitive capacities. Intelligent behavior is behavior that is sensitive to the circumstances of an 
organism and that can be rationalized by its relation to a goal of the organism; cognitive capacities 
are those that are exhibited in intelligent behavior. A cognitive mechanism, then, is a structure of 
component entities and component operations that are organized such that they produce intelligent 
behavior (adapted from Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000, Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, Craver 
2007). The entities that figure in cognitive mechanisms are things like representations, modules, 
brain areas, populations of neurons, or idealized “neurons” in artificial neural networks. 
Characteristic operations in cognitive mechanisms are processing operations on or between those 
entities: transformations of representations, computational interactions between modules and brain 
areas, activation and inhibition of neuron populations, and interactions between artificial neurons as 
specified by connection weights. The organization of these entities and operations into mechanisms 
is usually represented by graphs, but can be specified more or less completely by groups of equations 
or descriptions of relations between components. Cognitive models are models of how mechanisms 
produce cognitive capacities (possibly or actually), and functional roles can be assigned to 
components of the models according to how those components contribute to the mechanism’s 
production of that capacity (roughly as described in Cummins 1975). Cummins-style functional 
roles, however, are not functional descriptions; they describe a component’s contribution to a 
capacity rather than conferring identity conditions in virtue of relations to input, outputs and 
intermediate states, and are thus independent from Putnam-style functionalism (see Craver 2001 for 
a discussion of Cummins-functions and neo-mechanism). 
If the mechanist framework is to overcome functionalism’s difficulties with generalization, it 
must provide an alternative to the covering-law framework, or even a covering-model framework 
  
(Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, Craver 2007, 66–70). After all, it is now widely believed that the 
biological and social sciences have no true laws. William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen (2005) 
suggest that mechanistic explanations are generalizable not because the target systems are identical in 
the relevant respects, but because they are similar: 
The need to invoke similarity relations to generalize mechanistic explanations seems 
to be a limitation of the mechanistic account. But in fact it may be the mechanistic 
account that provides a better characterization of how explanations are generalized 
in many sciences. Laws are generalized by being universally quantified and their 
domain of applicability is specified by the conditions in their antecedents. On this 
account, no instance better exemplifies the law than any other. But in actual 
investigations of mechanisms, scientists often focus on a specific exemplar when first 
developing their accounts. (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, 438) 
The claim that generalization is based on similarity to exemplars is less satisfying than the picture of 
subsumption under a covering law. Bechtel and Abrahamsen’s claims do little to constrain the 
practice of licit generalization, and their observation that scientists “seem to have an intuitive sense” 
of how to generalize is distinctly unsatisfying (ibid). However, given the lack of universal or 
exceptionless laws in the biological sciences, a more complicated conception of generality is needed. 
The need to be more specific about “similarity”-based generalization is not a drawback of the 
mechanist framework, but a demand for further research by philosophers of science. 
The mechanist framework offers richer resources than functionalism for constrained 
similarity-comparisons. First, mechanism models are more structured than functional descriptions. 
Functional descriptions might be structured according to independent predicates or conjuncts inside 
the scope of the quantifier in a Ramsey sentence. In comparing two mechanisms, one can appeal to 
similarities and differences between the sets of entities, of operations, their properties, or in their 
organization. Importantly, the result of such comparisons is not a judgment that mechanisms 
described by different models are simply the same or different, but that they are similar in certain 
respects and dissimilar in others. Frequently, a model may apply but with modifications, with the 
consequence that insights are gained both for the new and for the original target systems. For 
example, the two visual streams hypothesis (Milner & Goodale 2006) was developed for primate 
visual systems, primarily with data from humans and macaques, but comparisons of primates and 
other organisms such as frogs enrich the model (see e.g. Goodale & Humphrey 1998, 183–185) and 
provide a framework around which similar models can be developed for most vertebrates 
(Jeannerod & Jacob 2005, 301). Generalization here is achieved through comparisons to exemplars 
with acknowledgement of differences, not subsumption under a common description. This is 
mechanistic generalization by, if you like, functional similarity, but not functional identity in 
Putnam’s sense. Since similarity-based generalization like this does not presuppose that generality 
and abstraction from detail are correlated. Thus the motor theory of speech perception and the 
normalization model of visual feature-detection are not anomalies in the mechanist framework. 
  
It might be possible to provide similarity-based generalizations of functionally-individuated 
kinds, but such a strategy is not pursued by those who appeal to functionalism in order to settle 
other questions in philosophy of cognitive science. For example, the strategy is not pursued by 
Adams and Aizawa, Rupert, or Sprevak in their criticism of HEC, who instead seek categorical 
descriptions of mental or cognitive processes. Clark and Chalmers appeal to a relatively abstract 
specification of memory to argue that Otto’s notebook functions as a part of his memory. RAA 
appeal to relatively detailed specifications of memory to argue that he does not. An ecumenically-
minded theorist might suggest that alternative specifications—some detailed and some abstract—
delineate various dimensions of similarity and difference between paradigmatic memory and Otto’s 
notebook-augmented memory. However, such a proposal must specify how membership is decided 
for the set of admissible descriptions for a term. The main products of cognitive scientific research 
(apart from philosophical research) are models, not functional descriptions. The mechanist 
framework provides a more natural resource for appeal in philosophy of cognitive science than an 
unarticulated successor to functionalism. In general the place for functionalism as a resource for 
appeal in philosophy must be reevaluated.  
 
5 Conclusion. My intention in this paper was to show that the assumptions of functionalism are 
inappropriate for thinking clearly about cognitive science. To this end I described some discussion 
of the RAA objections to HEC, and claimed that Sprevak’s “grain parameter” makes explicit an 
assumption that features in the motivating arguments for functionalism: that abstraction from detail 
and generality are correlated features of cognitive models. This assumption is false, so functionalism 
is an inappropriate framework for characterizing cognitive models and for settling disputes about 
cognitive science, like the dispute over HEC, that turn on generality. I suggested, following a 
suggestion by Bechtel and Abrahamsen, that where the functionalist framework hides the 
complexity in cognitive scientists’ practice of generalization, the mechanist literature provides a more 
fruitful framework for exploring that complexity. I have not argued that mechanism settles whether 
HEC is true or false. However, if disagreements about HEC are to be a battle for the soul of 
cognitive science, the proper battleground is over what kinds of mechanisms are cognitive ones, not 
over functionalist descriptions of mental states (cf. Walter 2010). The mechanist framework does 
not provide us with resources for determining the identity conditions of cognitive phenomena like 
belief and memory, as the functionalist framework does. However, cognitive scientists do not take 
conformity to their models as a criterion of exhibiting a phenomenon. For example, psychologists 
do not claim that exhibiting interference effects is a necessary condition on memory. That a system 
does not exhibit interference effects implies that memory models that do exhibit such effects must 
be modified in order to be generalized to that target system, not that the target system lacks genuine 
memory. It is therefore peculiarly contentious for philosophers to appeal to these models in order to 
settle the identity conditions for cognitive phenomena under the guise of being scientific. The 
contentious nature of this form of argument is no doubt obscured by the common belief that 
functionalism is an orthodoxy of cognitive science.   
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